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1 Apophaticism and Kataphaticism in Neoplatonic
Thought
To begin with, the reader may please forgive the author if the grandiose title
of this presentation raises expectations it cannot fulfill due to lack of space and
time. Rather, may the reader apply the apophatic method to the presentation
itself and take the title not as signifying the thing itself but merely the hope of
the future attainment of what it attempts to signify. That said, it caught my
eye that the organizers of the workshop in Oslo on Platonism and Christian
Thought proposed the topic of “apophaticism in Greek thought” for presen-
tation. Apophaticism or negative theology refers, simply speaking, to the im-
possibility of knowledge of God as he is in his essence. Already Plato in the
Parmenides gives an account of the difficulty or impossibility of knowledge of
the One (τὸ ἕν) as the highest principle that transcends even being (οὐσία) itself.1
Plato’s reasoning was subsequently taken up by Plotinus, for whom the One is
at its root nothing other than an expression for total apophatic transcendence,
as extreme unity negates the duality of subject and predicate.2 There can thus
be no knowledge or designation of the One as it transcends the duality entan-
gled with knowledge. In front of this total transcendence apophaticism appears
as the only appropriate way of doing philosophy. Plato in a classical passage
of his Timaeus already said that knowledge of “God” ist difficult to attain and
1Platon. “Parmenides”. In: Platon Werke. Ed. by Auguste Diès. Trans. by Friedrich Schleier-
macher. Vol. 5. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2005, 141d8-142a8.
2Jens Halfwassen. Plotin und der Neuplatonismus. München: C.H. Beck, 2004, pp. 43-49.
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communicate.3 For both Plotinus and Plato the One caused another of itself that
proceeded from the One. Consequently, in spite of the total transcendence of
the first principle, there is a certain continuity between the first principle and
the cosmos as some sort of imitation or image of the first principle. Plato de-
scribes this continuity as follows: As the cosmos is good and beautiful so also
is its Creator.4 Also for Plotinus the One is the Good.5 This shows that an ac-
count of negative theology or Neoplatonic apophaticism, which refers to the
transcendence of the first principle, must include the notion of positive theol-
ogy or kataphaticism as well, as the One is in a certain respect in continuation
or analogy with the cosmos. Thus Plotinus applies “quasi-predications” to the
One, which then are denied of it once more.6 In other words, for Plotinus be-
ing directed towards the One consists in thinking of more and more things to
deny of the first principle. This intention towards the One follows the interplay
between the total transcendence of the One and its being the cause of effects in
which it is expressed, however remotely.
When Plotinus thinks about the absolute freedom of the One, the One tran-
scends any relation it may have to itself, so that even the relation of a self that
relates to itself as an other must be negated of the One.7 This is where Neopla-
tonism and Christian Theology seem to part ways, as the Christian Trinity is a
relation of persons. Proclus seems to go even further than Plotinus in that he
even demands that the mind’s operation of negation of things about the One
itself be negated, as the One transcends the very relationality of thought. This
relationless state of the mind constitutes the highest possible union with the
first principle that is beyond thinking.8 The case of Maximus the Confessor, a
Christian Theologian highly influenced by the Platonic tradition through Ps-
Dionysius, illustrate how Christian theology incorporated Platonic and Neo-
3Platon. “Timaios”. In: Platon Werke. Ed. by Klaus Widdra and Albert Rivaud. Trans. by Hi-
eronymus Müller. Vol. 7. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2005, 28c3-5: “Find-
ing the Creator and Father of all things is laborious and, having found him, communicating him
to all is impossible.”
4Platon, “Timaios”, 29a2-3.
5Halfwassen, Plotin und der Neuplatonismus, 14: “[A]ls der Urgrund allen Seins ist das Eine
für Platon zugleich das Gute (agathon), worin ihm Plotin folgt.” See Plotin. “Enneads”. In:
Plotini Opera. Ed. by P. Henry and H.-R. Schwyzer. 3 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964-1984,
II 9, 1, 1-8.
6Halfwassen, Plotin und der Neuplatonismus, 139: “Jene analogen Quasi-Prädikationen, die
Plotin dem Einen in der zweiten Gedankenreihe zuspricht, erweisen sich damit als ein Durch-
gangsstadium seiner Argumentation, das die negative Theologie weder durchbricht noch ein-
schränkt. Aber dieses Durchgangsstadium erweist sich gerade in seiner Vorläufigkeit und Un-
eigentlichkeit als aufschlussreich und unentbehrlich, um die reine Transzendenz selber als ab-
solute Freiheit einzusehen.”
7Halfwassen, Plotin und der Neuplatonismus, pp. 140-1.
8Halfwassen, Plotin und der Neuplatonismus, pp. 160-1.
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platonic thought.
2 Maximus’ Reception of Neoplatonic Thought
There has been previous research on the question of the reception of Platonic
thought by Maximus. As Doucet has shown against Riou in 1979,9 it is hardly
feasible to divide Maximus into an earlier (Neo-)Platonic philosopher and the-
ologian, who trusted totally in the teleology of nature and the cosmos to lead
him up to God by way of negative theology, and the later monk who saw his
time in near apocalyptic turmoil, thus lost this trust in the natural order and fo-
cused entirely on the person of the Word of God to lead him to the final end of
salvation. In this metamorphic view ofMaximus, represented by the Dominican
school of Schönborn, Riou, Garrigues and Heinzer,10 the reception of Platonic
philosophy by Maximus is construed as a total, albeit preliminary subscription
to a hierarchical i.e. Platonic-Ps-Dionysian conception of participation, as vis-
ible in Maximus’ stress on the logoi of every nature, and a subsequent emanci-
pation from this Platonic “essentialism” towards a more Christian view of the
innovation of nature through Christ’s person, as indicated by the addition of a
personal mode of being to the natural logos which supposedly led Maximus to
form the couple of logos-tropos that is essential to the thought of Maximus. In
this view, discovering the reality of the person and the “hypostatic tropos” led
Maximus to break through the boundaries of nature as the only ascent towards
God.11
9Marcel Doucet. “Vues récentes sur les ‘métamorphoses’ de la pensée de saint Maximus le
Confesseur”. In: Science et Ésprit (31 1979), pp. 269–302; Alain Riou. Le monde et l’église selon
Maxime le Confesseur. Théologie historique 22. Paris: Éditions Beauchesne, 1973, pp. 68-9.
10Christoph Schönborn. Sophrone de Jérusalem. Vie monastique et confession dogmatique. Théolo-
gie historique 20. Paris: Beauchesne, 1972; Juan Miguel Garrigues. Maxime le Confesseur. La
Charité. Avenir divin de l’homme. Théologie historique 38. Paris: Éditions Beauchesne, 1976; Fe-
lix Heinzer. Gottes Sohn als Mensch. Die Struktur des Menschseins Christi bei Maximus Confessor.
Paradosis. Beiträge zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur und Theologie 26. Fribourg:
Universitätsverlag Freiburg, 1980; Léthel also entertains a metamorphic view of Maximus with
regard to the question of the energies in Christ. See François-Marie Léthel. Théologie de l’agonie
du Christ. La liberté humaine du Fils de Dieu et son importance sotériologique mises en lumière par
Saint Maxime le Confesseur. Paris: Éditions Beauchesne, 1979.
11Even the great Maximian scholar Balthasar in the first edition of his book on Maximus in
1941 held the view that Maximus underwent an certain Origenist crisis, not quite being able
to hold together all the differing views Maximus tried to synthesize in his thought. However,
Balthasar claimed that Maximus remained true all his life to the Ps-Dionysian metaphysics of
a hierarchical world, albeit with certain qualifications. Certainly Maximus was inspired by Ps-
Dionysius concerning the dialectic of negation and affirmation. See Hans-Urs von Balthasar.
Kosmische Liturgie. Das Weltbild Maximus’ des Bekenners. 3rd ed. Trier: Johannes-Verlag, 1988,
p. 76.
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As it often does in scholarly research the pendulum swung the other way
with Eric Perl, who presented his PhD thesis in 1991 on the Neo-Platonic con-
cept of participation in Maximus the Confessor.12 There he explains, that the
first principle of Maximus’ metaphysics is christological and “it is precisely this
Christocentric doctrine that allows Maximus, not to reject, but to retain and
perfect the Neoplatonic metaphysics.” Thus, Maximus essentially remains a
“thoroughgoing eastern Christian Neoplatonist, neither a proto-Thomist nor a
proto-existentialist.”13 For Perl, Maximus sees the reality described by Neopla-
tonists realized in Christ.14 Additionally Perl makes the important distinction
that the perfection or beauty of nature and the cosmos, which would reliably
lead humanity back to God in a Neoplatonist framework, depends for Maximus
fundamentally on the right exercise of human freedom and is thus only fully re-
alized and accessible in Christ, who alone cooperated in his human nature freely
and perfectly with God.15 Perl is certainly right in criticizing a supposed divi-
sion of Maximus into a Neoplatonic philosopher and a Christian theologian.
However, the question remains, whether a Christian thinker can succeed in to-
tally integrating Neoplatonic philosophy, which by today’s standards was just
as much a “theology” as it was a philosophy, without making certain changes
to fundamental principles that constitute Neoplatonic thought such as the doc-
trine of participation. Concretely speaking, Maximus received “Neoplatonism”
mostly through Ps-Dionysius, and the question for scholarly research is to what
extent Ps-Dionysius succeeded in Christianizing Neoplatonism or whether he
submitted Christian Theology to Neoplatonic principles.
The question of Maximus’ reception of Neoplatonism through Ps-Dionysius
is still being discussed, as shown by the discussion between Larchet16, who
seems to deny the existence of a precise concept of participation in Maximus’
thought, an Tollefsen, who relates the Plotinian, Proclean and Ps-Dionysian
models of participation to Maximus and argues for an equally sophisticated
concept in Maximus that he applies to his Christology or rather the incarna-
tion in a wider sense.17 In short, Tollefsen explicates Maximus’ sophisticated
12Eric David Perl. Methexis: Creation, Incarnation, Deification in Saint Maximus Confessor. Yale
University: PhD Thesis, 1991.
13Perl,Methexis: Creation, Incarnation, Deification in Saint Maximus Confessor, p. 315.
14Perl,Methexis: Creation, Incarnation, Deification in Saint Maximus Confessor, p. 316.
15Perl, Methexis: Creation, Incarnation, Deification in Saint Maximus Confessor, pp. 316-319; For
Maximus the human virtues are not an addition to nature, but are essentially the very enactment
of human nature and the virtues show what that nature is. See Maximus Confessor. Dispute de
Maxime le Confesseur avec Pyrrhus. Ed. by Marcel Doucet. 2 vols. Université de Montreal: PhD
Diss. masch., 1972, 309B.
16Jean-Claude Larchet. La divinisation de l’homme selon S. Maxime. Paris: Éditions du Cerf,
1996, pp. 600-1.
17Torstein Theodor Tollefsen. The Christocentric Cosmology of Saint Maximus the Confessor. Ox-
4
concept of participation, which simultaneously implies God’s difference and
unity with his creation, by the distinction between essence and activity/energy,
which Maximus seems to hint at in his work.18 God’s essence is totally tran-
scendent, whereas his activity constitutes the logoi, which are for Tollefsen the
formal principles of creation’s participation in God’s activity.19 This focus on the
more Palamite distinction of essence and activity within God Tollefsen shares
with David Bradshaw and both relate this distinction with the allegedly more
apophatic approach of Eastern theology.20 Being aware of Maximus’ reception
of Neoplatonic thought through Ps-Dionysius it will be helpful to examinemore
closely what wemean byMaximus’ “radical apophaticism”.21 Perhaps it is even
possible to show that Maximus’ methodology is not as opposed to the main
representative of Western Theology, Thomas Aquinas, as one might think and
thus, as could be argued, not exclusively dependent on the essence-energy dis-
tinction.
3 Maximus’ Negative Theology
Note that from a Neoplatonic viewpoint it is not sufficient to simply point out
that God’s essence cannot be known and is transcendent. Rather, in order to find
a proper way of speaking about God Christian theology as well as Neoplatonic
thought have had to account for God’s relation to his creation with regards to
both God’s transcendence and his “continuity” with creation. The understand-
ing of God’s relation to creation informs the way we speak and think about him.
In Amb. 34 Maximus argues for an interplay of negation and affirmation when
thinking about God or rather “around” (περί) the substance of God. Negation
and affirmation are opposites when considered by themselves, but are harmo-
ford Early Christian Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, 216; 219. Tollefsen admits,
though, over against Larchet that Maximus never explicitly defines his concept of participation
in clear terms. Note that by “Christology” or the incarnation, Tollefsen seems to include the pre-
existing and creative Logos within the Trinity, who undergoes three progressing incarnations
in cosmos, Scripture and ultimately Jesus Christ. See Torstein Theodor Tollefsen. Activity and
Participation in Late Antique and Early Christian Thought. Oxford Early Christian Studies. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 122-3.
18Tollefsen, The Christocentric Cosmology of Saint Maximus the Confessor, pp. 160-169; 221-224.
19Tollefsen, The Christocentric Cosmology of Saint Maximus the Confessor, pp. 169-171.
20David Bradshaw. “The Concept of Divine Energies”. In: Divine Essence and Divine En-
ergies. Ecumenical Reflections on the Presence of God in Eastern Orthodoxy. Ed. by Constantinos
Athanasopoulos and Christoph Schneider. Cambridge: James Clarke, 2013, pp. 27–49, 45: “[The
essence-energy distinction in God] succeeds in incorporating the apophatic approach to God in
a way that western theology does not. The divine ousia is beyond any act of naming or concep-
tual thought, known only by actively sharing in its energetic expression.”
21Tollefsen, The Christocentric Cosmology of Saint Maximus the Confessor, p. 165.
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niously interrelated when applied to the things around the essence of God.22 It
seems that Maximus refers in Amb. 34 to a more detailed account contained in
the introduction to his Mystagogia,23 where Maximus approaches God in three
steps: first God is the cause of all that is known and predicated and can thus be
called affirmatively the mind and word and life of everything. Secondly, as the
source of all being God cannot be put in the same order as beings, because he
transcends them, and should thus be negatively and more properly called non-
being. In a third step, the Theologian has to realize that ultimately the predi-
cations of being and non-being are not predicated of God in a proper sense, as
neither presents God as he is in his essence and being. Therefore God is beyond
affirmation and negation. Note that the whole conceptual form and interplay of
these three steps is needed for a so-called negative theology, also in a Neopla-
tonic view.24 Considering this methodology, Maximus stands in close proximity
to what Thomas Aquinas, commenting on Ps-Dionysius’ Divine Names25 would
later call the triplex via causalitatis, eminentiae et negationis.26 Parsing out the sim-
ilarities and distinctions of the thought of these authors would take us too far
afield here.
As is clear in Amb. 34, the crucial character of God’s mode (tropos) of being is
that he unites extremes, affirmation and negation that exist separately by nature
- the famous coincidentia oppositorum so important for Plotinus. With regards to
Neoplatonism, the methodology of affirmation, negation and supereminence
22Maximus Confessor. On Difficulties in the Church Fathers. The Ambigua. Volume II. ed. by
Nicholas Constas. 2 vols. Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library 29. Cambridge, MA and London,
England: Harvard University Press, 2014 (henceforth cited as AmbIo (Constas II)), 34, 64,11-
66,22 (1288A-C).
23Maximus Confessor. Mystagogia. Una cum Latina interpretatione Anastasii Bibliothecarii. Ed.
by Christian Boudignon. Corpus Christianorum. Series Graeca 69. Turnhout: Brepols, 2011,
9,103-10,126 (664A-C).
24Te Velde makes this point succinctly about Aquinas, but I would argue it is equally valid
for Ps-Dionysius and Maximus. See Rudi te Velde. Aquinas on God. The “Divine Science”
of the Summa Theologiae. Ashgate Studies in the History of Philosophical Theology. Alder-
shot/Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006, 92, fn. 26: “One should [. . . ] be cautious about attributing
the core of ‘negative theology’ to the acknowledgement of Deus semper maior: ‘God as always
greater than all we can know’ [. . . ] This is definitely not how it works. One cannot presuppose
God as a given prior and external to the structure of our knowledge of God and then conclude
that God is always beyond our knowledge. The point is that this ‘beyond’ must be expressed in
the conceptual form of our knowledge if it is to be more than a pious gesture to safeguard the
object of faith from the immanence of conceptual thought.”
25Dionysius Areopagita. De divinis nominibus. Ed. by Beate Regina Suchla. Patristische Texte
und Studien 33. Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1990, VII,3 (197,22-198,3): εἰς τὸ ἐπέκεινα πάντων ὁδῷ καὶ
τάξει κατὰ δύναμιν ἄνιμεν ἐν τῇ πάντων ἀφαιρέσει καὶ ὑπεροχῇ καὶ ἐν τῇ πάντων αἰτίᾳ. Διὸ καὶ ἐν
πᾶσιν ὁ θεὸς γινώσκεται καὶ χωρὶς πάντων.
26See Fran O’Rourke. Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas. Notre Dame, IN: Uni-
versity of Notre Dame Press, 2005, pp. 31-41.
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allows for the human mind’s ascent towards the first principle. In Christian
theology, the goodness of God does not stop at creation or emanation as in
Neoplatonism, but goes to the extreme of God’s own incarnation: God goes
out of himself and becomes man in Christ. This was clearly seen by Origen
in his dispute with the philosopher Celsus.27 Due to the incarnation, which is
the utmost immanence of God within creation, Christian theology is able in a
sense to affirm God’s epistemological and ontological transcendence even more
than Neoplatonism, as God needs to reveal himself in order to be found and
remains ontologically transcendent even in his immanence. However, the same
methodology of negative theology is valid in Christology.
InMaximus’ Christology the divinemode of beingmanifests itself concretely
in Christ’s human actions. Maximus’ account of Christ’s agony in the garden
is highly informative in this respect, but cannot be dealt with here.28 Another
example used by Maximus in order to illustrate how we have to interrelate
negation and affirmation in contemplating God incarnate is Christ’s miracu-
lous walking on water.29 By walking on water Christ brings together the firm-
ness of solid ground and the fluidity of water - two realities which are natu-
rally opposed to each other (except when a lake freezes over, but this is not the
point here). In front of this coincidentia oppositorum in Christ’s mode of being
and actions, Maximus deploys his hermeneutics of affirmation and negation
by affirming the logos of Christ’s human nature and Christ’s full humanity, but
negating Christ’s human nature’s human mode (tropos) of existence for the sake
of a supernatural divine mode, which transcends and negates nature’s duali-
ties by unifying them.30 To give another example, in Mary God’s transcendent
unity reveals itself and renews nature by bringing together the natural reali-
ties of being a mother and a virgin, which would be naturally opposed to each
27With respect to the goodness of God, Origen claims that Christian theology gives greater
glory to God than Plato, as the Christian God’s goodness is so great as to become incarnate and
give himself to the world. See Origenes. “Contra Celsum V-VIII”. in: Origenes Werke. Band 2.
Ed. by Paul Koetschau. Die griechisch-christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte 3.
Leipzig: J. C. Hinrich’sche Buchhandlung, 1899, pp. 1–293, VII, 42 (192,22-193,22). Origen does
not share Celsus’ optimism in regard to the human being’s capability to find God by himself.
Man ist not able to find God, if he does not receive help by God’s revelation of himself in the
flesh.
28For a more detailed account see Jonathan Bieler. “Maximus the Confessor on Christ’s Hu-
man Will”. In: Communio. International Catholic Review 43.1 (2016), pp. 55–82; Adrian Walker.
“The Freedom of Christ: Notes on ‘Gnomie’ in Maximus the Confessor”. In: Communio. Inter-
national Catholic Review 43.1 (2016), pp. 29–54.
29Maximus Confessor. Ambigua ad Thomam una com Epistula secunda ad eundem. Ed. by Bart
Janssens. Corpus Christianorum, Series Graeca 48. Turnhout/Leuven: Brepols, 2002, 5 (23,73-
84)[Half of the passage is a quote from Ps-Dionysius.
30Maximus Confessor, Ambigua ad Thomam una com Epistula secunda ad eundem, 5 (24,99-104).
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other, in order to give birth to the transcendent God the Word.31 In Maximus’
perspective the beyond-Platonic goodness of God leads to the revelation of the
unity of God that totally transcends creation within creation itself. This is why
creation’s participation in God culminates in Christ, as through his human ex-
istence God’s goodness is freely allowed to be poured forth to its final degree in
the outpouring of Christ’s life on the cross.
Two examples from Maximus’ Ambigua to Thomas might serve to illustrate
Maximus’ apophaticism in Christology. In the 5th Ambiguum Maximus ex-
tensively quotes Ps-Dionysius’ 3rd letter, which shows the Areopagite’s deep
influence on Maximus’ method.
“But the one who eternally transcends being is no less overflowing
with transcendence”, for although he became man he was not yoked
under human nature. On the contrary, he raised human nature up
to himself, having made it another mystery. He remained entirely
incomprehensible, and showed his own incarnation to be more in-
comprehensible than every mystery, in that he came forth by means
of a birth beyond being. To the degree that he became comprehen-
sible on account of the incarnation, by so much more was he known
as more incomprehensible through it.
For “he is hidden after the appearance”, says the teacher, “or, to
speak more divinely, even in the appearance. For this mystery of
Jesus has also been hidden, and it has been reached by no reason
and no intellect, but even while being spoken of, it remains ineffa-
ble, and while being conceived, it remains unknown”. What could
be more demonstrative than this for the purposes of demonstrating
the divine “transcendence of being”? It shows “what is hidden by
means of an appearance”, and the speechless by “a word”. It shows
“to the intellect” what is unknown because of its superiority, and, to
affirm something even more radical, “that which is beyond being”
by its entrance into being.32
God transcends being and reveals himself as transcending being even in his
incarnation. What we can see of him in his revelation is thus in one sense him
and in another not - again the interplay or rather transcendence of affirmation
and negation expresses best God’s mode of being.
A second example from the first Ambiguum shows Maximus’ approach to
God’s Trinitarian unity. Even though a Trinitarian God seems to move between
31Maximus Confessor, Ambigua ad Thomam una com Epistula secunda ad eundem, 5 (26,143-149).
32Maximus Confessor, Ambigua ad Thomam una com Epistula secunda ad eundem, 5 (22,50-65).
Translation by Joshua Lollar.
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the poles of Monad and Triad, this movement is not God’s ownmovement from
one to three since he transcends any sort of movement. Movement is associated
with creation and therefore God is without motion and change within himself:
But if, having heard the word “movement”, you wonder how the di-
vinity that is beyond eternity is moved, understand that the passiv-
ity belongs not to the divinity, but to us, who first are illumined with
respect to the rational principle of its being, and thus are enlightened
with respect to the mode of its subsistence, for it is obvious that be-
ing is observed before the manner of being. And so, movement of
divinity, which comes about through the elucidation concerning its
being and its manner of subsistence, is established, for those who are
able to receive it, as knowledge.33
This motion of the mind is the result of God’s revelation and even though
God himself does not move, this motion constitutes the only possible knowl-
edge (γνῶσις) of God within us. God reveals himself in the human condition
that is less one than he is himself and thus cannot express his unity as he is
in himself, but even so he truly communicates himself to us who are different
from him, while remaining totally transcendent and other to us by transcend-
ing the opposition of movement and no-movement. This final negation of the
duality of apophaticism and kataphaticism as operations of the mind reflects in
my view that God and creation are separated by an abyss, yet this gulf does not
prevent God’s immanence within his creation.34 Even more, without this gulf
between God and creation, which was so crucial for Maximus, God and God’s
crossing of this gulf would lose their immeasurable depth of transcendence and
goodness that would not shine forth if creation simply consisted in a fall from a
higher perfection and unity to a lower form of it.
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